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Abstract
Evaluating an agent’s performance in a stochastic
setting is necessary for agent development, scien-
tiﬁc evaluation, and competitions. Traditionally,
evaluation is done using Monte Carlo estimation;
the magnitude of the stochasticity in the domain or
the high cost of sampling, however, can often pre-
vent the approachfromresulting in statistically sig-
niﬁcant conclusions. Recently, an advantage sum
technique has been proposed for constructing unbi-
ased, low variance estimates of agent performance.
The technique requires an expert to deﬁne a value
function over states of the system, essentially a
guess of the state’s unknown value. In this work,
we propose learning this value function from past
interactions between agents in some target popu-
lation. Our learned value functions have two key
advantages: they can be applied in domains where
no expert value function is available and they can
result in tuned evaluation for a speciﬁc population
of agents (e.g.,noviceversus advancedagents). We
demonstrate these two advantages in the domain of
poker. We show that we can reduce variance over
state-of-the-art estimators for a speciﬁc population
of limit poker players as well as construct the ﬁrst
variancereducingestimators for no-limit pokerand
multi-player limit poker.
1 Introduction
Evaluating an agent’s performance is a common task. It is
a critical step in any agent development cycle, necessary for
scientiﬁc evaluation and useful for determining the results of
a competition, which have become popular in the artiﬁcial
intelligence community. In some cases it is possible to com-
pute an exact measure of performance, but only for small or
deterministic domains. In the other cases, the most common
approach is to use Monte Carlo estimation. The agent com-
pletes a number of repeated independent trials of interaction
in the domain, and a sample average of its performance is
used as an estimate. The magnitudeof the stochasticity in the
domain, however,may preventthe approachfrom resultingin
statistically signiﬁcant conclusions, particularly if the cost of
trials is high.
Recently, Zinkevich and colleagues [2006] proposed an
advantage-sumtechnique for constructing a low-varianceun-
biased estimator for an agent’s performance. The estimator
examines the complete history of interaction for a trial, un-
like Monte Carlo which uses only the single value (utility) of
the agent’s per-trial performance. As the estimator is prov-
ably unbiased (matching the player’s realized utility in ex-
pectation), a sample average using the estimator provides an
alternative, potentially lower-variance, estimate of an agent’s
performance. Unfortunately,the approachrequires a domain-
speciﬁc value function to be provided, which much satisfy
certain constraints. Furthermore, the variance reduction of
the resulting estimator depends entirely on the quality of the
provided value function. This limits the applicability of the
approachto well-understooddomains for which a value func-
tion can be constructed. Although the approach was success-
fully used to achieve dramatic variance reduction in evaluat-
ing play for two-player, limit Texas hold’em poker [Billings
and Kan, 2006], the difﬁculty in hand-crafting appropriate
value functions for other domains is limiting.
In this paper, we propose using machine learning to ﬁnd a
value function to be used in an advantage-sum estimator. We
deﬁne an optimization to directly minimize the estimator’s
variance on a set of training data and derive a closed form
solution for this optimization in the case of linear value func-
tions. The optimization results in two distinct advantages.
First, it canbemoreeasily appliedtonewdomains. Insteadof
requiring a hand-crafted, domain-speciﬁc value function, our
approachonlyrequiresaset ofdomain-speciﬁcfeaturesalong
with data from previous interactions by similar agents. In
fact,ifagoodhand-craftedvaluefunctionis alreadyknown,it
canbeprovidedasafeature,andtheoptimizationcanresultin
further variance reduction. Second, our approach can ﬁnd an
estimator for agent evaluation that is tuned to a speciﬁc pop-
ulation of agent behavior (e.g., advanced behavior or novice
behavior) by providing such data in training. The approach
is general, applying to a wide variety of domains: single
agent and multi-agentdomains; fully and partiallyobservable
settings; as well as zero-sum and general-sum games. We
demonstrate the efﬁcacy of the approach on the classic two-
player limit poker game and two poker domains for which
no previous variance reduction estimator exists: a two-player
no-limit and a 6-player limit game.2 Background
We will ﬁrst describe extensive games as a general model for
(multi-)agent interaction. We will then discuss previous ap-
proaches to agent evaluation.
2.1 Extensive Games
Deﬁnition 1 [OsborneandRubinstein,1994,p. 200]A ﬁnite
extensive game with imperfect information has the following
components:
• A ﬁnite set, N, of players.
• A ﬁnite set ,H, of sequences, the possible histories of
actions, such that the empty sequence is in H and every
preﬁx of a sequence in H is also in H. Z ⊆ H are
the terminal histories (those which are not a preﬁx of
any other sequences). A(h) = {a : ha ∈ H} are the
actions available after a non-terminal history h ∈ H1.
To denotethata history h is a preﬁxof a terminalhistory
z, we will write h ⊑ z. ,
• A player function P that assigns to each non-terminal
history, h ∈ H\Z, a member of N ∪ {c}, where c rep-
resents chance. P(h) is the player who takes an action
after the history h. If P(h) = c, then chance determines
the action taken after history h.
• A function fc on {h ∈ H : P(h) = c} associating to
each such history a probabilitymeasure fc( |h) on A(h)
(fc(a|h) is the probability that a occurs given h). Each
probability measure fc( |h) for a given h is independent
of the other probability measures fc( |h′), h′  = h.
• For each player i ∈ N a partition Ii of {h ∈ H :
P(h) = i} with the property that A(h) = A(h′) when-
ever h and h′ are in the same member of the partition.
Ii is the information partition of player i; a set Ii ∈ Ii
is an information set of player i.
• For each player i ∈ N a utility function ui from the
terminal states Z to the reals R.
The extensive game formalism is a very general model of
sequential decision-making and encapsulates ﬁnite-horizon
POMDPs (where |N| = 1), ﬁnite-horizon MDPs (where
|N| = 1 and ∀Ii |Ii| = 1), and n-player general-sum or
zero-sum games. The only additional assumption made in
this work is that the game Γ (but not any player’s policy) is
known.
A strategy of player i, σi in an extensive game is a func-
tion that assigns a distribution over A(Ii) to each Ii ∈ Ii.
A strategy proﬁle σ consists of a strategy for each player,
σ = (σ1,σ2,...σ|N|). The goal of agent evaluation is to
estimate the expected utility of some player j ∈ N given a
strategy proﬁle, i.e.,
Uj = Ez [uj(z)|σ]. (1)
If the extensive game is small, one can compute this expec-
tation exactly by enumerating the terminal histories. In large
games, however, this approach is not practical.
1We write ha to refer to the sequence with action a concatenated
to history h.
2.2 Monte Carlo Estimation
The traditional approach to agent evaluation is to estimate
the expectation in Equation (1) by sampling. The agents re-
peatedly interact with the environment, drawing independent
samples z1,...,zT from the distribution Pr(z|σ). The esti-
mator is simply the average utility,
ˆ Uj =
1
T
 
t
uj(zt). (2)
This estimator is unbiased (i.e., E[Uj|σ] = E[uj(z)|σ]), and
so the mean-squared-error (MSE) of the estimate is its vari-
ance,
MSE(ˆ Uj) = Var
 
ˆ Uj|σ
 
=
1
T
Var[uj(z)|σ]. (3)
This approachis effective when the domain has little stochas-
ticity (i.e. Var[uj(z)] is small), agent trials are cheap (i.e. T
can be made large), and/or the required precision is not small
(i.e. large Var(ˆ Uj) is tolerable). If trials are expensive rela-
tive to the domain’s stochasticity and requiredprecision, then
it may not be possible to make statistically signiﬁcant con-
clusions based on this estimate. This limitation oftenarises in
situationsinvolvinghumanorphysicalrobotparticipants. For
example, in one particular poker game (two-player 1/2 limit
Texas hold’em), the standard deviation of a player’s outcome
is around $6 and a typical desired precision is around $0.05.
This precision would require more than ﬁfty thousand trials
to achieve. If one or more of the players is a human (or many
agent pairings must be evaluated), this large number of trials
is impractical.
One approachto improvingthe Monte Carlo estimatoris to
ﬁnda betterestimate ofper-trialutility. Thegoalis to identify
a real-valued function on terminal histories ˆ uj(z) where,
∀σ Ez [ˆ uj(z)|σ] = Ez [uj(z)|σ]. (4)
In other words, Equation (4) means that ˆ uj(z) is an unbiased
estimator of uj(z). If the variance of ˆ uj(z) is lower than
the variance of uj(z), then we can use ˆ uj in place of uj in
Equation (2) to get an improved estimator.
Wolfe [Wolfe, 2002] employed this approach in evaluat-
ing performance in blackjack. Using a baseline policy with
a known expected performance, Wolfe compares the player’s
winnings on a given hand with the winnings the baseline pol-
icy would have attained had it been employed. The result-
ing unbiased estimator is this difference added to the base-
line policy’s known expected winnings. Wolfe showed the
approach could result in a 50-fold reduction in the standard
deviation of the resulting estimator for evaluation in black-
jack. The approach, however, is limited to single-agent set-
tings and tends to over penalize near-optimal decisions with
unlucky outcomes.
2.3 Advantage Sum Estimators
Recently, Zinkevich and colleagues [2006] introduced a gen-
eral approach to constructing low-variance estimators for se-
quential decision-making settings. Assume one is given a
real-valued function on histories Vj : H → ℜ. Deﬁne the
following real-valued functions on terminal histories,SVj(z) =
 
ha⊑z
P(h) =c
Vj(ha) − Vj(h) (5)
LVj(z) =
 
ha⊑z
P(h)=c
Vj(ha) − Vj(h) (6)
PVJ = Vj(∅). (7)
We will call SVj the skill for player j, LVj the luck for player
j, and PVj the value of player j’s position (a constant). We
label these functions skill and luck because the skill is ob-
tained from changes in the value function due to the agents’
actions (i.e. its advantages) and the luck from changes in the
value function due to actions by chance. Notice that the skill
function for player j includes actions for all players, and so
all the players’ actions affect all players’ skill terms.The ad-
vantage sum estimator is now simply,
ˆ uVj(z) = SVj(z) + PVj. (8)
Using the fact that terms cancel when summing skill, luck,
and position, we can see that,
uj(z) = SVj(z) + LVj(z) + PVj. (9)
If Vj is chosen carefully so that E
 
LVj(z)|σ
 
is zero (the
zero-luck constraint), then ˆ uVj is an unbiased estimator. Ad-
ditionally,the advantagesum estimatorsubsumesWolfe’s ap-
proach for one-player games.
DIVAT, the Ignorant Value Assessment Tool, implements
the advantage sum idea for two-player, limit Texas hold’em
using a hand-designed value function shown to satisfy the
zero-luck constraint. The resulting estimator has proven to
be very powerful, with approximately a three-fold reduction
in per-trial variance. As a result, nine-times fewer hands are
required to draw the same statistical conclusions. Though
DIVAT has been successful in two-player, limit poker, the
hand-designedvaluefunctiondoesnotextendtoother(poker)
games. Moreover, no useful reduced-variance estimator has
been identiﬁed for no-limit poker or games involving more
than two players.
3 Our Approach: MIVAT
A more general approach to using the advantage sum estima-
tor from Equation (5) is to learn a good value function from
past interactions between players. This approach has two ad-
vantages. First, designing a value function can be difﬁcult,
particularly in the case of limited domain knowledge. Sec-
ond, learning a more speciﬁc value function to a group of
players (using a population of such players as the training
data) can further reduce variance in the assessment for those
players. This section deﬁnes an optimization for ﬁnding the
ideal value function, and then derives a closed-form solution
for the space of linear value functions. We call this general
approach and closed-form solution to the optimization MI-
VAT, the Informed Value Assessment Tool.
Our goal is to minimize the variance of ˆ uVj(z). Using
Equation (9), we can rewrite the advantage sum estimator
only in terms of the outcome’s utility and luck,
ˆ uVj(z) = uj(z) − LVj(z). (10)
In order to ensure Vj satisﬁes E
 
LVj(z)|σ
 
= 0 (the zero-
luck constraint), let’s assume that Vj(ha) is only providedfor
histories where P(h) = c, i.e. on histories directly following
achancenode.2 WethendeﬁneVj fortheremaininghistories,
where chance is next to act, to explicitly satisfy the zero-luck
constraint,
Vj(h s.t. P(h) = c) ≡
 
a′∈A(h)
fc(a′|h)Vj(ha′), (11)
so then,
LVj(z) =
 
ha⊑z
P(h)=c

Vj(ha) −
 
a′∈A(h)
fc(a′|h)Vj(ha′)

.
(12)
This reformulation of the advantage-sum estimator has two
beneﬁts. First, we need only deﬁne a value function for the
histories directly following chance nodes. Second, the value
function is guaranteed to be unbiased. Because of this guar-
antee, we are now unconstrained in our choice of value func-
tion.
Our goal is to ﬁnd a value functionthat minimizes the vari-
ance of the advantage-sum estimator. The variance of the
estimator depends upon the unknown agent strategies in the
target population. We presume that we have samples of out-
comes z1,...,zT from agents in this population, and use the
estimator’s sample variance as a proxy for the true variance.
This gives us the following target optimization.
Minimize:
Vj
T  
t=1
 
ˆ uVj(zt) −
1
T
T  
t′=1
ˆ uVj(zt′)
 2
3.1 Linear Value Function
In order to make the above optimization tractable, we focus
on the case where Vj is a linear function. Let φ : H → Rd
map histories to a vector of d features. We require,
Vj(h) = φ(h)Tθj, (13)
for some θj ∈ Rd. We will use ˆ uθj as shorthand for the
advantage-sumestimator from Equation(10), where Vj is de-
ﬁned as above.
We now derivea closed-formsolution, θ∗
j, to our optimiza-
tion. Let ut = uj(zt). From Equations (10) and (12), we
get,
ˆ uθj(zt) =
ut −




 
ha⊑zt
P(h)=c

φ(ha) −
 
a′∈A(h)
fc(a
′|h)φ(ha
′)






T
θj
(14)
2For simplicity, we assume that if P(ha) = c then P(h) 6=
c, i.e., the chance player never gets consecutive actions. A trivial
modiﬁcation can always make a game satisfy this constraint.Deﬁne the following shorthand notation,
At =
 
ha⊑zt
P(h)=c

φ(ha) −
 
a′∈A(h)
fc(a
′|h)φ(ha
′)

 (15)
A =
1
T
T  
t=1
At ¯ u =
1
T
T  
t=1
ut (16)
Then, ˆ uθj(zt) = ut − AT
t θj and 1
T
 T
t′=1 ˆ uθj(zt′) = ¯ u −
ATθj, and we get the following optimization.
Minimize:
θj ∈ Rd C(θj) =
T  
t=1
 
(ut − ¯ u) − (At − A)Tθj
 2
As our objective is convex in θj, we can solve this optimiza-
tion by setting the objective’s derivative to 0.
∂C(θj)
∂θj
= 0
= −2
T  
t=1
(At − A)
 
(ut − ¯ u) − (At − A)Tθj
 
= −2
T  
t=1
 
(At − A)(ut − ¯ u) − (At − A)(At − A)Tθj
 
Solving for θj,
θ
∗
j =
 
T  
t=1
(At − A)(At − A)
T
 −1  
T  
t=1
(At − A)(ut − ¯ u)
 
=
  
T  
t=1
AtAT
t
T
 
− AA
T
 −1   
T  
t=1
Atut
T
 
− ¯ uA
 
(17)
We call ˆ uθ∗
j the MIVAT estimator.
3.2 Multiplayer Games
For two-player, zero-sum games, we only need to learn a sin-
gle estimator ˆ uθ∗
1, since its negation is the variance minimiz-
ing estimator for the second player. In n-player, general-sum
games (n > 2), we must learn individual θj for each position
j. In the case of n-player,zero-sum games, however,the con-
dition
 |N|
j=1 ˆ uθ∗
j(z) = 0 may not be satisﬁed when each of
the functions are learned independently. We now show how
to learn a set of parametersθ =
 
θT
1 ,...,θT
|N|
 T
satisfying the
zero-sum constraint.
To satisfy the zero-sum constraint for a linear value func-
tion, it is sufﬁcient3 to require,
θ|N| = −
|N|−1  
j=1
θj.
3If the features are linearly independent on the sampled data,
then it is a necessary condition as well.
To satisfy the zero-sum constraint, set θN = −
 |N|−1
j=1 θj
and then only learn θ = (θ1,...,θ|N|−1). We can then op-
timize the column vector of unconstrained parameters θ =  
θT
1 ,...,θT
|N|−1
 T
to minimize the sample variance averaged
over all players.
DeﬁneS1,...,S|N| to ben×(|N|−1)n selectionmatrices
such that:
1. ∀ j ∈ {1,...,|N| − 1}, Sj has the identity matrix in
the jth n × n column block of the matrix, and is zero
elsewhere.
2. S|N| has the negativen×n identity matrix in all |N|−1
column blocks.
We can then write the target optimization as:
Minimize:
θ ∈ R(|N|−1)d C(θ) =
|N|  
j=1
T  
t=1
 
(ut,j − ¯ uj)
−(At − A)TSjθ
 2
where the selection matrices pick out the proper θj from θ.
As our objectiveis again convexin θ, we can solve this op-
timization by setting the objective’s derivative to 0. Stepping
through the derivation as before, we obtain the solution
θ∗ =


|N|  
j=1
ST
j
 
T  
t=1
(At − A)(At − A)T
 
Sj


−1


|N|  
j=1
T  
t=1
(At − A)Sj(ut,j − ¯ uj)


=


|N|  
j=1
ST
j
 
T  
t=1
AtAT
t
T
− AAT
 
Sj


−1


|N|  
j=1
 
T  
t=1
ut,jAt
T
− ¯ ujA
 
Sj


(18)
The estimator for player j is then ˆ uSjθ∗, where  
j ˆ uSjθ∗(z) = 0, ∀z ∈ Z.
4 Applications to Poker
The MIVAT approach is applicable to any extensive game
as well as frameworks subsumed by extensive games (e.g.,
ﬁnite-horizon MDPs and POMDPs). We explore its useful-
ness in the context of poker, a family of games involvingskill
and chance. We will ﬁrst give background on Texas hold’em
Poker, the basis for our three testing domains, and then de-
scribe how our approach was applied to these domains.
Texas Hold’em Poker. Texas hold’em is a card game for 2
to 10 players. A single hand consists of dealing two private
cards to each player from a shufﬂed 52-card deck. The play-
ers act over the course of four rounds, in which each player
in turn calls (matching the amount of money everyone else
has put into the pot), raises (increasing the amount of moneyeveryone has to put into the pot), or folds (giving up the hand
and losing whatever money they already placed into the pot).
In between each round, public cards are revealed (3, 1, and
1 after rounds 1, 2 and 3, respectively). Among the players
who have not folded after the fourth round, the player who
can make the best ﬁve card poker hand from their cards and
public cards wins the money placed in the pot. If all but one
player folds, they win the pot regardless of their hand.
Texas hold’em can be played with ﬁxed bet sizes (limit) or
no ﬁxed bet sizes (no-limit). We show results for two-player
limit, two-player no-limit, and six-player limit poker. The
remainder of this section explains how we applied MIVAT in
each of these domains.
Implementation. We employed variations on ﬁve basic
poker hand features. Hand-strength (HS) is the expectation
over the yet-to-be-seen public cards of the probability of the
evaluated hand beating a single other hand chosen uniformly
at random. Hand-strength-squared (HS2) is the expectation
over the yet-to-be-seen public cards of the squared probabil-
ity of the evaluated hand beating a single other hand chosen
uniformlyat random. It is similar to hand-strengthbut gives a
bonus for higher variance. Pot equity (PE), requiring knowl-
edge of all players’ hands, is the probability that the evalu-
ated hand wins the pot assuming no additional player folds.
The base features involved taking each of these hand-values
for each player and multiplying them by pot size (PS), the
amount of money in the pot, to make the features more repre-
sentative of the potential utility (the ﬁnal pot size).
In the two-player games, therefore, we had 7 base fea-
tures. In order to allow for additional modelling power we
took products of the basic features to get quadratic functions
of the features instead of just linear functions. In some ex-
periments in the two-player, limit domain, we included an
additional feature: the hand-crafted value function used by
DIVAT. We did this to illustrate that we can improve on well-
designed value functions by using them as a feature. In the
six-player game, we did not use the pot equity feature (due to
its expensive computation4) or any feature cross-products.
5 Results
We examine the effectiveness of MIVAT using a number of
different sources of poker hands. In all three domains we
used data from programs playing against each other in the
2008 AAAI Computer Poker Competition (this involved nine
agents for two-player limit, four for two-player no-limit, and
six for six-player limit). We call this data “Bots-Bots”. For
the two-player limit domain, we also used a dataset involv-
ing a single strong poker program playing against a battery
of weak to strong human players. We call this data “Bot-
Humans”. For each experiment we separated the data into
450,000 training hands and 50,000 testing hands, and then
traineda linearvaluefunctionusingthe MIVAToptimization.
For each experiment we compare MIVAT’s performance to
4In two-player games, these features were pre-computed in a ta-
ble for all possible hand combinations. The two-player tables can
be used for hand-strength and hand-strength-squared in a six-player
game, but pot equity cannot.
Data MIVAT MIVAT+ DIVAT Money
Bot-Humans 2.387 2.220 2.238 5.669
Bots-Bots 2.542 2.454 2.506 5.438
Table1: Standarddeviationofestimatorsfortwo-player,limit
poker.
MIVAT MIVAT
Data Bot-Humans Bots-Bots DIVAT Money
Bot-Humans 2.169 2.253 2.238 5.669
Limit-Bots 2.461 2.418 2.506 5.438
Table 2: Standard deviation of tailored estimators for two-
player, limit poker.
that of Money (the estimator that just uses the player’s win-
nings on each hand) and, when appropriate, DIVAT.
Two-Player Limit Poker. We ﬁrst compare the MIVAT
optimization to the hand-crafted DIVAT estimator for two-
player, limit poker. We computed two estimators: one with
theDIVATvalueas a feature(MIVAT+)andonewithout(MI-
VAT). Both estimators were trained using the Bot-Humans
data. The standard deviation of these two estimators on test-
ing data from both the Bot-Humansdata and the Bot-Bot data
is shown in Table 1. First, note that MIVAT without the DI-
VAT feature was still able to reach comparable variance re-
duction to the hand-crafted estimator, a dramatic improve-
ment over the Money estimator. Further variance reduction
was possible when DIVAT was used as a feature. MIVAT+’s
improvement over DIVAT is statistically signiﬁcant for the
Bots-Bots data (even though it trained on the Bot-Humans
data) but not for Bot-Humans.
MIVATcanalsobeusedtotrainspeciﬁcestimatorsforspe-
ciﬁc populations of players. We trained an estimator specif-
ically for the Bot-Humans setting using the DIVAT feature
and exploiting the fact that we knew whether the bot was the
dealer oneach hand. We also trainedan estimator speciﬁcally
for the Bots-Bots data also using the DIVAT estimator. Ta-
ble 2 compares how well these functions and DIVAT perform
on the two datasets: one they were trained for, and the other
they were not. As expected, the functions perform better on
their respectivedatasets than the more generalfunctions from
Table 1. Using the speciﬁc function, we now statistically
signiﬁcantly outperform DIVAT on the Bot-Humans dataset.
NoticethattheestimatortrainedspeciﬁcallyfortheBots-Bots
dataset did not outperform DIVAT on the Bot-Humans data,
suggestingthat the estimatorscan betailoredto differentpop-
ulations of players.
Two Player No-Limit Poker. In two-playerno-limit poker,
the betting is only limited by a player’s stack (their remain-
ing money), which in the AAAI competition was kept at
$1000. As a result the standard deviation of a player’s win-
nings is generally much higher than in limit poker. MIVAT
was trained using all cross-products of the standard features.
Table 3 shows the resulting standard deviation on test data
from the AAAI no-limit competition. MIVAT resulted in aData MIVAT Money
Bots-Bots 32.407158 42.339743
Table 3: Standard deviation of estimators for two-player, no-
limit poker.
Data MIVAT Money
Bots-Bots 22.9234365 28.0091805
Table 4: Standard deviation of estimators for six-player, limit
poker.
25% reduction on the standard deviation in a game where no
hand-craftedvaluefunctionwas yet to be successful. Theless
dramatic reduction (as compared to limit) may be a result of
players’strategiesbeinginherentlyhighvariance,ormoreso-
phisticated features may be required. Features on the betting
rather than just the cards or speciﬁc features distinguishing
large-pot and small-pot games may result in additional im-
provements.
Six-Player Limit Poker. As in two-player, limit poker,
there is no known reduced-variance estimator in six-player,
limit poker. MIVAT was trained on 200,000 training hands
and 20,000 test hands with six features: HS to the power of
the number of non-folded players not folded. The standard
deviation of MIVAT and the Money estimators are shown in
Table 4. Again, MIVAT shows only a modest 20% variance
reduction. The inability to match the success in two-player
limitis likelyduetothelimitedfeatureset (nopot-equity)and
failure to capture the position of the players that had not yet
folded,akeyfactorinaplayer’swinnings. Thisresultdemon-
strates that MIVAT does not completely remove the need for
domain knowledge: informed identiﬁcation of features could
have considerable impact on the resulting estimator.
6 Conclusion
We introducedMIVAT, the InformedValue Assessment Tool,
a general automated approach to obtaining low-variance, un-
biased assessments of agent performance. We constructed an
optimization for ﬁnding the variance-minimizing value func-
tion for use in an advantage sum estimator. We then derived
a closed-form solution for the case of linear value functions.
Our approach overcomes the requirement in previous work
for hand-designed value functions, and can be used to tai-
lor agent assessment to a known population distribution. We
tested MIVAT on three variants of Texas hold’empoker: two-
player limit, two-player no-limit and six-player limit poker.
We showed that we can attain and even exceed the best exist-
ing hand-craftedesimator for two-playerlimit poker. We also
showed that we can construct variance reducing estimators
for two-player, no-limit and six-player, limit poker, where no
previous estimators were available, based solely on simple
poker features and logs of past experience.
There are two main avenues for future work. First, the MI-
VAT formulation focuses on optimizing a linear value func-
tion using variance as the loss. However, there are other
options for the optimization. Expected variance is a conve-
nient loss function, but like many squared-loss measures, it
is heavily biased by outliers. An alternative loss may pro-
vide better estimators for typical agents, even while having a
higher variance on average. Furthermore, optimizing non-
linear value functions may alleviate the challenge of con-
structing good features. Second, we are also interested in
extending the approach to complex settings where a fully ex-
plicit game formulation may not be available. For example,
Robocup [Kitano et al., 1997], TAC [Wellman et al., 2003],
and the General Game Playing Competition [Genesereth et
al., 2005] all have difﬁcult evaluation problems, but it is not
practical to fully specify their corresponding extensive game.
One can still, however, identify the role of chance in these
simulated settings as invocations of a random number gener-
ator. Luck terms with zero expectation could be computed
(and a variance-minimizing value function optimized) using
feature changes before and after the affects of the random
numbergeneratorare applied. This approachcouldresult in a
guaranteed unbiased variance-reducing estimator and hence,
more signiﬁcant competition results.
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